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Abstract 
 
 
 
The aim of this case study was to demonstrate the benefits of using ageing probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) 
results in risk-informed decision process.  
 
First stage of the activities was aimed on the development of dataset which reflects age-dependent reliability 
behaviour for selected components using plant-specific, VVER specific and generic data. The second part 
describes the integration process of time-dependent reliability dataset in PSA model, quantification and 
comparison between aging (APSA) and base case PSA decision making results. Practical insights and 
conclusions are also presented. 
 
The report was prepared by the Nuclear & Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), Yerevan, Armenia, in cooperation 
with the Institute for Energy and Transport, EC Joint Research Centre, Petten, Netherlands, in the framework of 
the EC JRC Ageing PSA Network Task 8 activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Core damage frequency (CDF), risk profile and risk Importance factors, which are being used 
as decision criteria in many applications, could evolve during the lifetime of the plant, and these 
changes have to be considered in decision making process. This feasibility study is aimed to 
demonstrate the benefits of using ageing probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) results in risk-
informed decision process.  
 
The work was performed within Task 8 of Ageing PSA European Network (APSA, [1]), and it 
was dedicated to practical applications that use the addressing of ageing effects in PSA, in order to 
evaluate the impact of ageing on the overall plant safety. Applications could be related to: 
 prioritization of safety-related activities using APSA results, 
 predictive evaluation of plant safety level, 
 prioritization of ageing management issues, LTO (long term operation) activities using APSA 
findings. 
 
First stage of the activities was aimed on development of dataset which reflects age-
dependent reliability behaviour for selected components using plant-specific, VVER specific and 
generic data. The second part describes the integration process of time-dependent reliability dataset 
in PSA model, quantification and comparison between APSA and base case PSA decision making 
results.  
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2. TASK SPECIFICATION 
2.1 SELECTION OF COMPONENTS  
Selection of components was aimed to reveal those which:  
 have significant role for nuclear safety and  
 have the potential to be seriously affected by ageing effects. 
Complementary techniques have been used for component selection, in order to assure the 
completeness of components list for further consideration.  
 
The components were selected based on a combination of the following criteria [4]: 
 numerical risk importance criteria (to address safety significance issue), 
 qualitative judgment (AFMEA - Ageing Failure Mode and Effects Analysis technique, to 
address ageing vulnerability issue). 
 
In order to optimize the available resources, estimation of time-dependency of reliability parameters 
has been performed only for selected components.  
 
Main approach for component selection according to safety significance was the development 
of risk-based components list, using risk parameters, based on probabilistic model available for 
Armenian NPP Unit 2. To determine the risk-importance of safety systems and components, the 
commonly used risk importance measures are the Fussell-Vesely (FV) and Risk Increase Factor 
(RIF). Fussel-Vesely importance factor is calculating by the following formula: 
Q
S
FV
c
j
j∑
1
      (1) 
 where:  
Sj – frequency of minimal set of failures which could lead to core damage,  
с – number of minimal cut-sets which contains basic events with failures of particular 
equipment or human error,  
Q – total frequency of core damage event.  
Physical meaning of this expression is proportion of minimal cut-sets with particular failure and total 
frequency of core damage event 
 
Limitation of Fussel-Vesely importance factor resides in neglecting the components which 
have low failure probability. However, since the failure probability may rapidly increase due to ageing, 
the use of Fussel-Vesely importance factor is not enough to assure the completeness of components 
list. During discussions with APSA Network partners, it was suggested to use also the risk increase 
factor (RIF) as an indicator, calculated by: 
Q
Q
RIF P 1       (2) 
 where QP=1 – conditional core damage frequency with particular failure.  
Use of risk increase factor allows taking into account the components with low failure probability but 
large consequences, in regard with core damage. 
 
 Screening criteria were established at 0.5 % (FV>0,005), as it was recommended by US NRC 
[6] and EPRI [7] and at 100 for RIF.  
 
The main problem of risk-based analysis is lack of information regarding equipment which is 
not in PSA model, but potentially could have a significant importance due to ageing-based decrease 
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of reliability parameters. To solve this issue the ageing failure mode and effects analysis (AFMEA) 
procedure was used, [5].  
 
Application of the above described approach leads to the following list of components, which 
were analyzed in detail (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 - List of components for further consideration 
 
# Components Base for components 
selection 
considered 
failure modes 
component boundaries, 
 
FV RIF AFMEA 
1.  Main feedwater 
pumps 
+   Fail to run 
Fail to start 
Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe  
Power supply– connection 
of cable to pump breaker 
(breaker is within pump’s 
boundaries) 
2.  Emergency make-up 
pump 
+ +  
3.  Spray pumps + +  
4.  RHR pumps +   
5.  Intermediate circuit 
pump 
+   
6.  Emergency feedwater 
pump 
+   
7.  Drainage pumps +   
8.  Emergency seismic 
feedwater pump 
+   
9.  Normal make-up 
pump 
+   
10.  Check valve 
(D<100mm) 
  + 
Fail to open 
Fail to close 
Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe 
11.  Check valve 
(D≥100mm) 
  + 
Fail to open 
Fail to close 
Fail to remain close 
Fail to remain open 
12.  Motor valve 
(D<100mm) 
+ +  Fail to change 
position 
Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe  
Power supply– connection 
of cable to pump breaker 
(breaker is within 
component’s boundaries) 
13.  Motor valve 
(D≥100mm) 
+ +  
14.  Motor ducts +   
15.  Manual valve 
+ +  
Fail to change 
position 
Fail to remain open 
Fail to remain close 
Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe  
Power supply– connection 
of cable to pump breaker 
(breaker is within 
component’s boundaries) 
16.  Steam-dump valves 
+   
Fail to change 
position 
Fail to remain close 
Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe  
Power supply– connection 
of cable to pump breaker 
(breaker is within 
component’s boundaries) 
17.  TG stop valves 
+   
Fail to close Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe  
Power supply– connection 
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# Components Base for components 
selection 
considered 
failure modes 
component boundaries, 
 
FV RIF AFMEA 
of cable to pump breaker 
(breaker is within 
component’s boundaries) 
18.  Fast changing filters +   Fail to operate Flow– welding and flanges in 
pipe 
19.  Diesel-generator 
+   
Fail to run 
Fail to start 
Power output - connection 
of cable to generator  
Service water – valve on 
cooling line (valve is not 
within component’s 
boundaries)  
Fuel – welding on pipe 
between external and 
internal fuel system  
Oil – welding on pipe 
between external and 
internal oil system 
20.  Switchers +   Fail to operate Commutable lines – 
connection of cable to the 
key 
21.  Interlocks switchers +   
22.  0.4kV buses (cubicle) 
+ +  
Power supply  - connection 
of cable to cubicle’s breaker 
(breaker is not within 
component’s boundaries) 
23.  Level sensor  +  Flow – connection to the 
impulse line 
Power supply  - connection 
of cable to Transducer 
Control signals – inlet and 
outlet of control cables of the 
device 
24.  Pressure sensors’ 
 +  
25.  Transducer of level 
sensors’ 
 +  Power supply  - connection 
of cable to Transducer 
Control signals – inlet and 
outlet of control cables of the 
device 
26.  Transducer of 
pressure sensors’  +  
27.  Transformer ≤ 6kV  +  Power supply  - connection 
of cables to the transformer 
28.  6kV buses + +  Power supply  - connection 
of cables to electrical bus 
29.  0.4kV breakers + +  Fail to change 
position 
Commutable lines – 
connection of cable to the 
key 
Control signals – 
connection of control cables 
of the breaker  
30.  6kV breakers 
+ +  
 
 
Selected components failure statistics has been thoroughly examined, in order to identify any 
increasing ageing trend, or to assure that constant failure rate model is applicable.  
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2.2 DATA SOURCES 
Development of time-dependent reliability parameters dataset has been initiated by data 
gathering process for selected components. The following data sources have been used: 
 plant-specific data, 
 data from similar NPP, 
 generic sources. 
 
TIRGALEX database [10] was mainly used for active components ageing trend evaluation and 
NUREG-1829 [11] was used for estimation of LOCA frequencies. 
 
 
Plant-specific data 
 
Plant-specific data have been collected, from Armenian NPP Unit 2 systems and components 
failure records. Mainly PSA database was used since all of the selected components are modelled in 
PSA. Particularly, data contains the following information: 
 Component name,  
 System name,  
 Component type (pump, valve, etc.), 
 Failure impact,  
 Character of failure, 
 Date and timing, 
 NPP operational mode, 
 Root cause. 
 
Collected data are covering the period of plant operation starting from 1995 to 2007. Since 
plant-specific operational data from one unit is not sufficient for comprehensive time-dependent 
reliability analysis, the decision has been taken to use generic data information. 
 
Data from similar VVER-440 units  
 
Statistical data gathering process has been established in the frame of case study performed 
for VVER-440 equipment [9]. As a first step, the detailed technical description of selected components 
was distributed between Ageing PSA European Network participants. Data on selected components 
was gathered from similar VVER-440 plants (operating in Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) and it 
was provided only for the approximately similar components (from point of view of technical 
parameters, functions, operating conditions etc.). Operational data have been gathered from 14 units 
of NPP which are currently in operation. 
 
Detailed information on design and reliability characteristics and registered failures was 
presented in the following structure: 
 Component description,  
 Commissioning date, 
 Component boundaries, 
 Observation period / covered ages window, 
 Considered failure modes and operating states, 
 # of components in the sample for data collection, 
 # of observed failures per failure mode (# of observed non-critical failures), 
 Dates of failures / failure mode / component ID (Cause of failure), 
 Average # of hrs/demands per year per population, 
 Important modifications (is there any significant measures taken?), 
 Performance characteristics, 
 Environmental conditions,  
 Period of maintenance.  
 
Availability of this kind of representative data enables confident interpretation of results.  
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2.3 TIME-DEPENDENT RELIABILITY DATASET 
Two stages of data processing have been applied, [12]: 
 
1) Application of non-parametric test 
Non-parametric methods allow identifying whether the ageing trend is present, for a particular 
component. However, non-parametric methods are not able to give information about pattern of the 
trend. The test considers the null hypothesis (H0) which states that failure rate values (λi) are 
identically distributed against the alternative that a trend is present.  
 
2) Application of parametric test  
The aim of parametric methods application is to identify a pattern for components ageing 
trend. Parametric methods were applied for cases when non-parametric analysis rejects H0 
hypothesis. 
 
The following statistical models were applied for reliability parameter function (p(t) - probability 
of failure on demand,  - parameters, t – time):  
 Constant failure rate model,  
 Log-linear model:   1 2ln ;t t       
 Power-low or Weibull model:    21;t t    
 Complementary log-log model: –,  
 Logit model: ln (p(t)/(1 – p(t))) = ,  
 Probit model: where 
 - is the inverse function of cumulative normal 
distribution. 
Checking of reliability models assumptions was implemented using p-value “best fitting” 
criteria (p=0,5), [12]. According to the results of non-parametric test, application H0 hypothesis was 
considered appropriate for the following equipments: 
1. Secondary device of pressure sensors, 
2. Emergency make-up pump, 
3. Drainage pumps, 
4. RHR pumps, 
5. Main feedwater pumps, 
6. Diesel-generator, 
7. Normal make-up pump, 
8. Fast changing filters, 
9. Primary device of level sensors, 
10. Secondary device of level sensors. 
 
For the above listed equipments, the constant failure rate reliability model is applicable.  
 
For cases when H0 hypothesis has been rejected, parametric test was applied to identify the 
pattern of components ageing trend. The results of parametric test application (results derived using 
WinBUGS code) are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 - List of components with increasing ageing trend observed 
 
# Component Failure mode Pattern θ1 θ2 
1.  6kV buses Fail to operate Loglinear -13.01 0.08314 
2.  Switcher Fail to operate Loglinear -15.39 0.3145 
3.  0.4kV breaker Fail to change position Power 2.298 4.12E-07 
Fail to remain in position Loglinear -16.74 0.1251 
4.  Motor valve (D>100mm) Fail to change position Loglinear -13.65 0.07406 
5.  Pressure sensor Fail to operate Loglinear -18.41 0.236 
6.  6kV breaker Fail to change position Loglinear -13.23 0.0284 
7.  Motor valve (D<100mm) Fail to change position Power 4.79E-06 0.346 
 
Plant-specific or VVER specific data were not available for the rest of selected components, so 
generic TIRGALEX ageing trend data was assigned (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3 - Generic ageing rate values of components with lack of VVER-specific information 
 
# Component Failure mode Ageing rate  
[h-1 y-1] 
Base case 
value1 
1.  0.4kV bus Fail to operate 1,10E-09 4,02E-07 
2.  Manual valve Fail to change position 2,73E-06 8,69E-05 
Fail to remain open 2,20E-09 5,86E-07 
Fail to remain close 2,20E-09 7,01E-08 
3.  Intermediate circuit cooling pump Failure on demand 2,20E-07 3,12E-05 
Fail to run 2,20E-07 1,23E-04 
4.  EFW and ESFW Failure on demand 2,20E-07 3,87E-06 
Fail to run 2,20E-07 9,61E-05 
5.  Transformer ≤ 6kV Fail to operate 1,70E-09 7,25E-07 
6.  Check valve (D≤100mm) Fail to open 3,80E-09 8,14E-08 
Fail to close 3,80E-09 7,32E-07 
7.  Check valve (D>100mm) Fail to open 3,80E-09 2,62E-07 
Fail to close 3,80E-09 9,30E-08 
Fail to remain closed 3,80E-09 1,88E-07 
Fail to remain open 3,80E-09 9,43E-08 
8.  Steam dump valves Fail to change position 2.17E-07 5.28E-06 
Fail to remain closed 7,00E-07 1,70E-05 
9.  Spray pump Failure on demand 5.31E-09 5.00E-06 
Fail to run 2.20E-07 2.07E-04 
10.  Interlock switch Fail to operate 2.30E-07 1.08E-06 
11.  Motor driven duct Fail to change position 3.60E-06 2.64E-5 
12.  TG stop valves Fail to close 4.00E-07 8.46E-06 
 
Beside the above components, primary piping ageing trends have been revised using 
investigation described in NUREG-1829, [11]. 
                                                 
1
 value used in PSA model 
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2.4 INCORPORATION OF T-D RELIABILITY DATASET IN PSA MODEL 
Ageing PSA model has been developed based on third iteration of base case level 1 PSA 
model for Armenian NPP Unit 2. The characteristics of the model are as follows: 
 Undesired event considered: Damage of the fuel located in the reactor core 
 Considered regimes: 50-100% of nominal power (regimes with both turbines in operation) 
 Considered initiators: Internal initiating events 
 
Base case PSA model corresponds to 25 years of operation and it was developed using Risk 
Spectrum code. Integration process of time-dependent reliability dataset was implemented by Risk 
Spectrum «Exchange event» function. Parameters of basic events in the model were changing 
against boundary conditions, which represent different plant lifetime periods (four periods were 
considered -30 years, 35 years, 40 years and 45 years).  
 
Time-dependent reliability dataset was developed within stage 1 of feasibility study and it 
contains the list of components considered in the analysis, divided in three main parts:  
1) components for which specific pattern of increasing ageing trends were revealed, 
2) components for which generic linear ageing trends were conservatively applied due to lack 
of statistical data2 and  
3) components for which constant reliability model was found.  
 
For the rest of selected component groups applicability of constant failure mode was justified 
within stage 1.  
2.5 PSA MODELS QUANTIFICATION 
Quantification was performed for base case PSA model and PSA model with integrated time-
dependent reliability dataset (Ageing PSA model). The aim of quantification process is to calculate the 
frequency of core damage and to derive risk profile information. Risk Spectrum quantification module 
gave also information about risk importance factors, sensitivity parameters and uncertainty values.   
 Two stage quantification processes was applied. Post-processing has been used In order to 
cover human errors dependency. Results presented below are obtained after post-processing 
calculations. Core damage frequency (CDF) calculations were done taking into account minimal cut- 
set analysis basic parameters with absolute cut-off value 10-14 [1/y]. 
 
Base case PSA model quantification 
 
Core damage frequency analysis show that CDF mean value is equal to 8.50E-05 [1/y], with 
upper bound equals to 1.36E-04 [1/y] and lower bound equals to 5.30E-05[1/y].  
Risk profile obtained during quantification is presented on Figure 1.  
 
As it is shown in Figure 1, 80% of total CDF value is conditioned by the first 9 initiators. The 
role of different mitigation measures failure for mentioned initiators is presented in Appendix 2.     
 
Figure 2 presents the contribution to overall CDF coming from different initiating event classes. 
Classification of initiating events is performed based on IE consequences and plant responses 
similarity. It could be easily noticed from Figure 2 that the largest core damage risk contributors are 
primary and secondary leaks, which contributes with 83% of overall core damage frequency. 
                                                 
2
 Preliminary quantification was performed without generic ageing trend applied for the components with lack of statistical 
data, and the results obtained were compared with final quantification results. Comparison shows that results are mainly 
dominated by increasing ageing trends, revealed using plant-specific statistics. To assure consistency, it was decided to use 
integrated ageing PSA model with generic ageing trends applied for these components, since impact of those data is 
negligible for decision making process.  
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Primary leaks 
Minimal cut-sets of LOCA events are dominated by several factors connected with failure of 
mitigation systems: emergency core cooling system (ECCS), spray system (SS), essential loads 
service water system (ESWS), AC power supply system, DC power supply system, etc.  However, as 
it is shown in Appendix 2, the risk coming from LOCA events is mainly dominated by 2 groups of 
minimal cut-sets, related to: 
 ECCS failure to provide water in primary circuit and  
 failure of spray system to perform boron tank cooling function. 
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Figure 1 - Risk profile for base case PSA model (25 years of operation) 
Figure 2 - Contribution of different IEs classes for base case PSA model  
(25 years of operation) 
 
Secondary circuit breaks
26%
Reactivity accidents
2%
LOCAs in confinement
45%
Transients
11%
Support systems failure
3% LOSP
1%
Interface LOCAs
12%
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Page 6 
Those groups are changing their contribution portion depending on LOCA type: for small 
LOCAs main contribution is coming from spray system failures, for bigger ones – ECCS failures. This 
is conditioned by the fact that for small LOCAs the success criteria of ECCS is significantly changing, 
from small diameter LOCAs to the big ones, whereas for spray system boron tank cooling function 
success criteria remains the same. Overall picture could be summarized as follows: emergency core 
cooling system and spray system have similar role in LOCAs sector presented on Figure 2.  
 
Secondary leaks 
Minimal cut-sets of secondary leakage events are dominated by several factors, connected 
with failure of mitigation systems: steam leak isolation valve system, SG feedwater systems 
(secondary feed & bleed function), primary feed & bleed systems (ECCS + SS), AC power supply 
system, DC power supply system, etc. However, as it is shown in Appendix 2, the risk coming from 
secondary leakage events is mainly dominated by 3 groups of minimal cut-sets, related to: 
 Failure to close fast steam isolation valves, to prevent reactor cold overpressure effect, 
 ECCS failure to provide water in primary circuit, during primary feed & bleed procedure 
and 
 Failure of spray system to perform boron tank cooling function, during primary feed & 
bleed procedure. 
 
In case of failure of FSIV, the secondary side leakage will lead to rapid decrease of primary 
temperature, which will lead to cold overpressure. In case of successful leak isolation it is foreseen to 
implement primary feed & bleed (F&B) function. It is assumed that in case of steam line breaks, 
steam and humidity in turbine hall will lead to damages of equipment responsible for secondary feed 
& bleed function (steam dump valves, SG feedwater pumps, etc). 
 
The specific cases are unprotected LOCA and reactor pressure vessel rupture events. Those 
events are directly leading to core damage. The only possible mitigating measure came from 
consideration of leak before break concept, which could significantly decrease probability of 
unprotected LOCA event.  
 
Ageing PSA model quantification  
 
Integrated APSA model has been quantified and calculated for each considered case (30 
years, 35 years, 40 years and 45 years), using the following assumptions:  
a) no modernizations or significant replacement of equipment are foreseen, 
b) CCF models recalculated based on new reliability parameters values (see tables 5 and 6), 
c) human error probabilities are constant, 
d) maintenance unavailability values (UM) are correlated with failure rate increasing, by 
applying new failure rate (λ) value in maintenance unavailability model  
UM=λTM 
where TM is average time for maintenance, 
e) error factors assigned to reliability parameters are not dependent from failure rate values. 
 
Core damage frequency analysis results for ageing PSA model are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 - Results of CDF calculations for Ageing PSA model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# CDF 
Base case 
CDF [1/y] 
CDF calculations with incorporated ageing 
aspects 
25 30 35 40 45 
1.  Mean value  8.50E-05 1.20E-04 2.12E-04 6.93E-04 1.18E-02 
2.  Upper bound 1.36E-04 1.89E-04 3.48E-04 1.17E-03 2.72E-02 
3.  Lower bound 5.30E-05 7.48E-05 1.26E-04 3.97E-04 6.03E-03 
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The results show a rapid increase of CDF value (by a factor of 120) in the period from 40 to 45 
years of operation, while in the period from 25 to 40 years, CDF value increased only by a factor of 
8.15. As it is presented in table 4, large uncertainties are found for long-term predictions (45 years 
operation), and based on that, it was concluded that adequate predictions could be done only for 
relatively short time periods (<15 years), which are comparable with the period for which statistical 
data are available.  Hence, the results obtained for “45 years” case have not been taken into account 
for further comparison. 
 
Risk profile obtained during quantification is presented on Figure 3. 
Although events associated with primary and secondary leakages remain main contributors, 
the overall proportion of their contribution is decreased. At the same time the proportion of risk coming 
from transients is disproportionately increased (see Figures 3 and 4).  
 
General transient (GT) implies occurrence of scram, without any additional failures in plant systems. 
Hence MCSs of GT contains multiple failures related to primary and secondary feed & bleed 
functions, which are significantly affected by ageing.  
The detailed discussion of quantifications results is presented in chapter 3.   
 
2.6 RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
Results of PSA models quantification assure an adequate base for decision making process, 
in terms of risk information. The Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making (IRIDM) process is a 
systematic way of taking into account all the relevant factors in making decisions on a wide range of 
safety, security or regulatory issues that could arise for any type of nuclear facility [2].  
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DETERMINISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
ORGANISATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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Figure 5 - Flowchart of integrated risk-informed decision making process 
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In applying the IRIDM process, all the relevant factors are identified and assessed to provide 
inputs to decision making process (see Figure 5). These factors typically include mandatory 
requirements (such as legal requirements and regulation), the insights from the deterministic analysis 
(such as defence in depth and safety margins), the insights from the risk assessment (usually 
obtained from a PSA model) and any other considerations that are relevant to the issue being 
addressed (such as radiation doses to workers and members of the public, or cost-benefit analysis). 
The inputs to the decision making process include the results and information from qualitative and 
quantitative analyses, [2].  
 
The inputs to evaluate the options need to be established, and they can be presented by two 
main categories: non-probabilistic and probabilistic. Non-probabilistic inputs include the following: 
 Standards and good practices: this relates to the standards and good practices 
recognised in the Member State and includes legally binding requirements, regulatory 
requirements, national and international standards produced by professional bodies, 
standards and codes recognised by the nuclear industry, managerial procedures, and 
good practices identified from similar facilities; 
 Operational experience: this relates to the operating experience from the nuclear facility 
itself and for similar facilities relating to the issue being addressed and requires that a 
review of the operating experience is carried out; 
 Deterministic considerations: this relates to the way that the basic deterministic 
principles have been addressed and includes the insights from: design basis accident 
analysis, analysis of defence in depth and safety margins; 
 Organisational considerations: this relates to the management of safety aspects of the 
plant operation for the issue/ options being considered, including maintenance activities, 
training and plant procedures; 
 Security considerations: this relates to the physical protection of the facility and requires 
that the interaction between safety and security measures is taken into account in 
addressing the issue/ options; 
 Other considerations: this relates to the other requirements that may need to be 
addressed for specific issues/ options and includes: the radiation doses to workers in 
making plant changes; the costs and benefits from making plant modifications; and the 
remaining lifetime of the plant. This should also take into account the research being 
carried out, that relates to this issue.  
 
Probabilistic considerations relate to the input from the PSA model, and include information on 
dominant contributors and risk significance. However it is also very important to check applicability of 
PSA model for a particular task analysis. It could be the case when the scope or level of resolution of 
PSA model could be insufficient, for a particular decision to be made. For example, full power PSA 
model could not be used for shutdown risk related evaluations. PSA applicability for a particular case 
could be verified using IAEA TECDOC-1511 [3]. Obtained PSA results should be compared with risk 
criteria (if any) in order to come-up with prescribed decision principles.   
 
Integrated decision is made by weighting the above listed inputs. The importance of each input 
element is directly dependent upon the decision to be made [2].  
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3. RESULTS 
 
 
Risk profile  
 
Changes of risk profile and proportion coming from main risk contributors are conditioned by 
changes in mitigation functions failure probability. The distribution of contribution of mitigation 
functions is shown in Appendix 2. According to described results, CDF value is highly dependent on 
reliability of the following safety systems and their associated functions: 
 ECCS to provide cooling water to primary circuit, 
 Spray system to provide cooling of boron tank and 
 Steam isolation valves to prevent PTS.  
 
The importance of mentioned mitigation functions is conditioned by large contribution of 
primary and secondary leakage events3. Time behaviour of mitigation functions in overall MCS, for a 
specific initiator, is presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that fraction of ECCS function is decreasing in time as well as portion coming 
from support systems failure and PTS effect, while portion of risk connected with spray system 
failures is continuously increasing. Fast steam isolation valves intended to prevent PTS have been 
installed in 2000, so the ageing trend of these valves was not considered (constant failure rate model 
was applied for new equipment). It is not the case with ECCS and spray system, hence detailed 
investigation of those systems reliability behaviour was implemented [8].  
 
                                                 
3
 MLOCA – medium LOCA (100-200mm),  SLOCA – small LOCA (32-100mm),  VSLOCA – very small LOCA (9-32mm),  
SLB – steam line break,  MSH – rupture of main steam header 
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Three safety critical cases were selected for time-dependent reliability analysis:  
1. ECCS-4/6 case: Primary emergency core cooling system success criteria for Large LOCA 
event (4 pumps out of 6 are necessary) 
2. ECCS-1/6 case: Primary emergency core cooling system success criteria for Small LOCA 
event (1 pump out of 6 is necessary) 
3. SS case: Confinement spray system (with auxiliary function to cooldown ECCS boron 
tank) 
 
Figure 7 - Change of systems failure probability in time 
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The cases contain most of the equipments modelled explicitly in current PSA model. Fault 
trees of selected cases were recalculated for each considered lifetime period. Results of calculations 
are presented in Figure 7. As it is shown in Figure 7, the failure probabilities of systems are increasing 
during the lifetime. Rapid increase of failure probability is observed for spray system (by a factor of 
35), while for emergency make-up system the rise is much lower (by a factor of 4.5 for ECCS-1/6 
case and by a factor of 6 for ECCS-4/6 case). This effect is conditioned by a better redundancy 
applied in emergency make-up system design, in comparison with spray system. 
 
 
System components were investigated in order to understand the contribution of different 
group of components to the system failure probabilities. Results of investigation show that the 
proportions of contribution of different components groups are changing in time (see Figure 8). 
Particularly significant increase of I&C and electrical equipment contribution is observed. This effect is 
conditioned by high ageing rate revealed for such components (see table A1.1). However it is 
necessary to mention that I&C and electrical equipment are easily changeable and observed effect is 
also driven by assumptions made in the model (for instance see assumption (a)). It may be concluded 
that systematic monitoring and modification/ replacement of this equipment is necessary in the future. 
 
Importance analysis 
 
Risk importance analysis was performed for all modelled systems, using Fussel-Vesely (FV) 
factor (see Table 5). The decrease of risk importance for some systems is conditioned by its increase 
for others, and vice verse (taking into account that risk importance factors are relative).  
 
According to results presented in Table 5 contribution to the overall risk from several systems 
is rapidly increasing in time (more than a factor of 2 – see orange marked cells). Increasing 
significance of spray system is already discussed, main reasons of this effect being the LOCA events 
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sensitivity and problems associated to system design. The rest of orange marked systems are 
devoted to mitigate consequences of transients, which were found as most vulnerable from ageing 
point of view.  
 
Table 6 presents the results of importance analysis performed for system components, using 
Fussel-Vesely factor. Similar components were grouped on generic groups, and the table shows FV 
parameter for the representative component of the group. 
 
Importance analysis performed at components level shows that importance profile of 
components is drastically changing due to ageing. Meanwhile this effect is not observed at system 
level.  
 
 
Table 5 - Results of risk importance analysis for plant systems 
 
# System 
Type of 
system 
Fussel-Vesely parameter value for analysis 
cases X
4
 
25 30 35 40 
1.  Spray system SFS 3.18E-01 3.95E-01 5.65E-01 6.88E-01 ↑ 2.17 
2.  
Emergency core cooling 
system 
SFS 
1.36E-01 1.73E-01 1.14E-01 3.71E-02 0.27 ↓ 
3.  SG diesel make-up system SRS 1.05E-01 6.66E-02 6.27E-02 9.43E-02 0.90 ↓ 
4.  AC power supply system SFS 5.42E-02 5.01E-02 3.40E-02 1.35E-02 0.25 ↓ 
5.  TG stop valves SNO 5.26E-02 3.95E-02 2.32E-02 6.88E-03 0.13 ↓ 
6.  Fast steam isolation valves SFS 4.39E-02 4.28E-02 4.39E-02 4.62E-02 1.05 
7.  Residual heat removal system SRS 3.09E-02 6.18E-03 1.15E-02 3.50E-02 1.13 
8.  
Steam dump to the 
atmosphere  
SFS 
2.28E-02 2.11E-02 2.74E-02 7.87E-02 ↑ 3.46 
9.  SG seismic make-up system SFS 1.99E-02 2.54E-02 4.06E-02 1.20E-01 ↑ 6.02 
10.  
Essential service water 
system 
SFS 
1.77E-02 1.93E-02 1.55E-02 6.30E-03 0.36 ↓ 
11.  
Normal primary make-up 
system 
SRS 
1.17E-02 1.29E-02 1.48E-02 1.47E-02 1.25 
12.  Main feedwater system SNO 9.09E-03 5.80E-03 3.17E-03 9.19E-04 0.10 ↓ 
13.  Scram system SRS 5.49E-03 3.56E-03 1.85E-03 4.87E-04 0.09 ↓ 
14.  Steam dump to the condenser  SFS 2.95E-03 6.53E-03 1.67E-02 6.01E-02 ↑ 20.38 
15.  Emergency feedwater system SFS 1.53E-03 2.55E-03 4.28E-03 2.65E-02 ↑ 17.40 
16.  Main condensate system SNO 1.03E-03 1.49E-03 1.38E-03 1.33E-03 1.29 
17.  
Primary overpressure 
protection system 
SFS 
7.94E-04 5.12E-04 2.94E-04 1.07E-04 0.14 ↓ 
18.  Demineralizated water system SNO 5.56E-04 2.51E-04 5.46E-04 1.48E-03 ↑ 2.66 
19.  
MCP intermediate circuit 
system 
SNO 
2.66E-04 2.59E-04 2.93E-04 3.12E-04 1.17 
20.  DC power supply system SFS 1.19E-04 8.76E-05 4.85E-05 1.25E-05 0.11 ↓ 
21.  Boron preparation system SRS 1.59E-05 4.01E-06 2.02E-06 8.13E-06 0.51 ↓ 
22.  Heat sink system SNO 2.92E-06 5.69E-06 5.80E-06 4.49E-06 1.54 
                                                 
4
 “X” is a factor which shows difference between FV parameters for 40 and 25 years of operation (X=FV45/FV25) 
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Table 6 - Results of risk importance analysis for components 
 
Component
5
 System 
Fussel-Vesely parameter value for 
analysis cases X
6
 
  25 30 35 40  
Boron tank recirculation big valve (2B-20) SS 1.63E-01 2.10E-01 2.56E-01 2.15E-01 1.31 
Confinement spray valves (2B-12/1-3) SS 1.33E-01 1.69E-01 2.03E-01 1.67E-01 1.26 
Diesel-driven pump DP 8.99E-02 5.62E-02 5.25E-02 7.83E-02 0.87 
Boron tank recirculation small valve (2B-
20/1) 
SS 7.16E-02 8.63E-02 9.69E-02 7.19E-02 1.00 
ECCS discharge valves (2B-6,7/1,2) ECCS 6.09E-02 5.17E-02 3.39E-02 1.10E-02 0.18 
Diesel generators AC 3.54E-02 2.49E-02 1.43E-02 4.20E-03 0.12 
TG stop valves relay (ROT) TG 2.27E-02 1.66E-02 9.78E-03 2.76E-03 0.12 
TG stop valves relay (R501) TG 1.27E-02 9.21E-03 5.43E-03 1.47E-03 0.12 
TG stop valves relay (R71) TG 1.26E-02 9.16E-03 5.40E-03 1.46E-03 0.12 
Fast steam isolation valves 1-6 FSIV 1.17E-02 8.97E-03 6.32E-03 3.72E-03 0.32 
ESP discharge valves (2AP-5/1,2) ESFW 9.19E-03 8.25E-03 8.11E-03 8.40E-03 0.91 
Diesel pump discharge valve (DP-4) DP 9.01E-03 8.11E-03 7.67E-03 1.08E-02 1.20 
Fast steam isolation valve 7 FSIV 8.63E-03 6.18E-03 3.66E-03 1.11E-03 0.13 
ECCS discharge check valves ECCS 7.67E-03 6.78E-03 4.60E-03 1.52E-03 0.20 
NMS discharge main valve 2P-50 NMS 7.41E-03 8.65E-03 1.05E-02 1.13E-02 1.52 
ECCS pumps 1-6 ECCS 7.18E-03 5.65E-03 3.51E-03 1.04E-03 0.15 
Steam dump valves to atmosphere (BRUA) SDV 5.82E-03 1.10E-02 1.31E-02 1.16E-02 2.00 
Steam pressure sensors (22M-721-726) FSIV 5.62E-03 4.68E-03 3.79E-03 3.05E-03 0.54 
Motor valves on ESWS recirculation (1,2Br-
2,6) 
ESWS 5.45E-03 5.83E-03 5.26E-03 2.38E-03 0.44 
ESP discharge valves (2AP-4/1,2) ESFW 5.15E-03 5.15E-03 5.66E-03 5.96E-03 1.16 
0.4kV safety buses (2804 BNN,2805BNN) AC 4.52E-03 3.48E-03 2.47E-03 1.40E-03 0.31 
Spray system pumps 1-3 SS 3.98E-03 3.08E-03 1.95E-03 6.03E-04 0.15 
ESWS pumps (1,2NSO-1-3) ESWS 3.23E-03 2.37E-03 1.44E-03 3.79E-04 0.12 
Steam pressure sensors (21M-721-726) FSIV 2.56E-03 1.93E-03 1.45E-03 1.05E-03 0.41 
Diesel pump discharge valve (DP-2) DP 2.17E-03 1.80E-03 1.66E-03 2.20E-03 1.01 
Spray system discharge valves (2B-10/1,2) SS 2.05E-03 1.58E-03 9.94E-04 3.06E-04 0.15 
Main gate valves of RCS RCS 1.94E-03 3.20E-03 5.92E-03 8.63E-03 4.45 
Scram system relays (RA-5) Scram 1.90E-03 1.27E-03 7.45E-04 1.77E-04 0.09 
Pressurizer level sensors (2R-287) 
Scram+E
CCS
7
 
1.82E-03 1.23E-03 7.20E-04 1.70E-04 0.09 
FSIV Interlock switchers  FSIV 1.77E-03 3.15E-03 3.56E-03 3.63E-03 2.05 
ESP pumps (2ASN-1,2) ESFW 1.70E-03 1.69E-03 1.80E-03 1.60E-03 0.94 
ESP discharge valves (2AP-14/2) ESFW 1.69E-03 1.43E-03 1.40E-03 1.27E-03 0.75 
MFW discharge valve (21-26VP-9) MFW 1.62E-03 1.14E-03 6.41E-04 1.73E-04 0.11 
ESP discharge valves (2AP-14/1) ESFW 1.59E-03 1.34E-03 1.34E-03 1.24E-03 0.78 
DG cooling lines valves AC 1.56E-03 1.05E-03 5.95E-04 1.51E-04 0.10 
0.4kV buses (25,26BNN) AC 1.46E-03 4.15E-03 4.35E-03 2.43E-03 1.67 
0.4kV buses (14TR) AC 1.45E-03 4.13E-03 4.33E-03 2.42E-03 1.67 
0.4kV buses (21BN) AC 1.45E-03 4.13E-03 4.33E-03 2.42E-03 1.67 
0.4kV buses (10TR) AC 1.45E-03 4.13E-03 4.33E-03 2.42E-03 1.67 
                                                 
5
 Only components important from safety point of view for any of the lifetime periods (25,30,35 or 40) are presented 
6
 “X” is a factor which shows difference between FV parameters for 40 and 25 years of operation (X=FV45/FV25). Green 
marked fields shows cases when relative importance of the component is decreased, orange marked fields represent cases 
when relative importance of the component increased more than 10 times, white ones – represent the rest of the cases.  
7
 Such kind of sensors provide both signal to scram and activation of one of the safety systems 
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Component
5
 System 
Fussel-Vesely parameter value for 
analysis cases X
6
 
  25 30 35 40  
Primary pressure sensors (AR-650) 
Scram+E
CCS 
1.37E-03 9.10E-04 5.32E-04 1.25E-04 0.09 
Scram relays (1RA) Scram 1.36E-03 9.09E-04 5.32E-04 1.29E-04 0.10 
ESP discharge valves (2AP-3/1,2) ESFW 1.33E-03 1.23E-03 1.42E-03 1.46E-03 1.10 
Spray system discharge valves 2B-11/1,2 SS 1.25E-03 9.80E-04 6.32E-04 1.73E-04 0.14 
Boron tank (2B-8/2) ECCS 1.13E-03 8.35E-04 5.02E-04 1.47E-04 0.13 
RHR HXs cooling lines valves (TV-5,6) RHR 8.36E-04 1.18E-03 2.00E-03 3.68E-03 4.40 
EFW pumps EFW 8.36E-04 9.60E-04 1.11E-03 1.18E-03 1.41 
RHR pumps inlet valve (2P-14) RHR 8.32E-04 1.18E-03 1.99E-03 3.66E-03 4.40 
NMS pumps cooling lines valves NMS 7.48E-04 8.75E-04 1.07E-03 1.14E-03 1.53 
Switcher of 2B-20 valve SS 5.44E-04 1.35E-02 5.66E-02 1.64E-01 302 
Switchers of 2B-12/1-3 valves SS 4.74E-04 1.14E-02 4.68E-02 1.30E-01 274 
EFW pumps recirculation valves EFW 3.22E-04 3.92E-04 6.59E-04 1.66E-03 5.15 
Boron line discharge valves on NMS inlet 
(2B-69, 2P-17) 
BPS 2.53E-04 1.17E-03 1.50E-03 1.65E-03 6.52 
EFW pumps inlet valve (2VP-14) EFW 2.38E-04 3.36E-04 5.91E-04 1.20E-03 5.06 
ESWS recirculation valves ESWS 1.11E-04 7.51E-05 4.98E-05 9.61E-06 0.09 
EFW discharge valves (21,22VP-17) EFW 5.33E-05 3.40E-04 6.21E-04 1.65E-03 31 
FSIVs switchers FSIV 4.88E-05 1.33E-03 5.21E-03 1.10E-02 226 
6kV safety buses (3,4RB-2) AC 4.83E-05 5.64E-03 5.30E-03 2.49E-03 51 
ECCS pumps switchers ECCS 4.18E-05 8.50E-04 2.58E-03 3.96E-03 94 
Switchers of ESP discharge valves 2AP-
4/1,2 
ESFW 2.72E-05 8.24E-04 4.65E-03 2.67E-02 981 
Switchers of steam dump valves to 
condenser (BRUK) 
TG 2.53E-05 7.11E-04 2.98E-03 1.38E-02 546 
Switchers of steam dump valves to 
atmosphere (BRUA) 
TG 2.19E-05 9.46E-04 5.80E-03 3.50E-02 1599 
Switchers of ESP ESFW 6.50E-06 4.53E-04 3.20E-03 1.94E-02 2984 
Switcher of R-3 regulator (on the line from 
NMP to Prz) 
NMS 3.50E-06 1.28E-04 8.88E-04 3.59E-03 1026 
Switcher of EFW discharge valves 
(21,22VP-17) 
EFW 1.45E-06 1.25E-04 1.46E-03 2.16E-02 14845 
Switcher of RHR pumps inlet valve (2P-14) RHR 8.46E-07 4.76E-05 4.17E-04 3.04E-03 3592 
Switcher of RHR HXs cooling lines RHR 8.46E-07 4.76E-05 4.17E-04 3.04E-03 3592 
Switcher of RCS main gate valves  RCS 6.54E-07 8.90E-05 8.43E-04 4.57E-03 6988 
Interlock switcher of steam dump valves to 
atmosphere (BRUA) 
TG 2.86E-07 9.99E-05 7.87E-04 3.17E-03 11075 
 
Grey shaded cells represent components for which FV value is higher than the commonly 
used critical criteria 5E-03 [6]. It could be noticed that grey cells are migrating to the bottom of the 
table in time. Particularly, the following components were not initially covered by FV criteria, but will 
become critical due to ageing: 
o Main gate valves of RCS, 
o Switcher of 2B-20 valve, 
o Switchers of 2B-12/1-3 valves, 
o FSIVs switchers, 
o 6kV safety buses (3,4RB-2), 
o Switchers of ESP discharge valves 2AP-4/1,2, 
o Switchers of steam dump valves to condenser (BRUK), 
o Switchers of steam dump valves to atmosphere (BRUA), 
o Switchers of ESP, 
o Switcher of R-3 regulator (on the line from NMP to Prz) and 
o Switcher of EFW discharge valves (21,22VP-17). 
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Some of components presented in Table 6 are becoming less important in time, which is 
conditioned by the following factors: 
 Faster increase of failure probability of other systems/ components (consequential 
increase of their relatively importance) and 
 Change of proportion of initiating events contribution in the overall CDF value. 
 
For example, ECCS pumps have a significant role in LOCA related events, for which they are 
sharing contribution with spray system mitigation function. Observing ECCS pumps, it is clear that 
reduction of importance is conditioned by the following factors: 
 Relatively faster increase of spray system importance in time lead to decrease of ECCS 
mitigating function role in LOCA contributors (see Appendix 2) and 
 Relative increase of steam line breaks contribution portion in time lead to decrease of 
overall LOCA contribution (see Figure 6). 
 
It could be noticed that components which changed their importance by a factor more than 10, 
mainly use reliability parameters #1 to #7 presented in table A1.1. Those reliability parameters are 
calculated using plant-specific and VVER-specific data, [4]. It could be concluded that TIRGALEX 
data did not have significant influence on final results, which are driven by ageing trend analyses 
performed based on VVER and plant specific data. 
 
It is necessary to highlight that obtained results are very much dependent on the assumption 
(a) - no modernizations or significant replacement of equipment are foreseen. Thus appropriate 
monitoring and renovation is necessary for components #1 to #7 (see table A1.1) where significant 
ageing trends were found.  
 
 
Application of PSA results for systems classification 
 
The decision making approach was experimentally applied for safety-related systems 
classification. Decision making process was applied using PSA information obtained by base case 
PSA model and Ageing PSA model8. The aim of performed analysis was to demonstrate the 
differences between final decisions made using traditional PSA and Ageing PSA results.  
 
Definition of the task 
The aim of analysis was to draw out an outline for test & maintenance strategy at Armenian 
NPP Unit 2. Current strategy is based on qualitative considerations - all systems are categorized into 
three categories [14]: safety systems (SFS), normal operating systems related to safety (SRS) and 
systems dedicated to normal operation (SNO). Test & maintenance strategy, as well as other 
mandatory requirements are different, depending on system category. However, such kind of 
categorization does not take into account the quantified risk information. The defined task implies 
application of PSA results in order to improve current categorization and optimize the applied test & 
maintenance strategies. 
 
PSA model applicability  
Plant-specific PSA models (both base case PSA and ageing PSA) are developed for full power 
operation and consider the risk of internal initiating events. Application of existing PSA models is 
limited to the systems which have a certain role in reactor shutdown process, in case of accidents 
occurred at full power operation.  
 
Probabilistic considerations 
                                                 
8
 It is assumed that non-probabilistic considerations remain the same for both cases. Hence they were skipped from analysis 
– example was performed only for probabilistic considerations. 
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Total of 22 systems are considered (see Table 5 - 11 SFS, 5 SRS and 6 SNO) within the task. 
Fussel-Vesely risk importance factor has been used as an indicator for system importance9. Results 
of system level risk importance analysis are presented in Table 5. Systems have been grouped based 
on FV value. Four risk importance groups have been considered: 
 1st group (high importance): FV > 1E-01 
 2nd group (medium importance): 1E-01 > FV >1E-02 
 3rd group (low importance): 1E-02 > FV > 1E-03  
 4th group (negligible): FV < 1E-03 
 
In cases when FV values were on the edge of the groups criteria, a conservative assignment 
was done (e.g. system with FV=9.19E-04 was assigned to the third group). Summary results of 
systems grouping is presented in the table 7. 
 
Table 7 - Systems grouping based on risk importance 
 
Group 
Base case PSA results Ageing PSA results10 
System FVBCPSA System FVAPSA 
1
st
 group 
(high) 
Spray system 3.18E-01 Spray system 6.88E-01 
Emergency core cooling system 1.36E-01 SG seismic make-up system 1.20E-01 
SG diesel make-up system 1.05E-01 SG diesel make-up system 9.43E-02 
2
nd
 group 
(medium) 
AC power supply system 5.42E-02 Steam dump to the atmosphere  7.87E-02 
TG stop valves 5.26E-02 Steam dump to the condenser  6.01E-02 
Fast steam isolation valves 4.39E-02 Fast steam isolation valves 4.62E-02 
Residual heat removal system 3.09E-02 Emergency core cooling system 3.71E-02 
Steam dump to the atmosphere  2.28E-02 Residual heat removal system 3.50E-02 
SG seismic make-up system 1.99E-02 Emergency feedwater system 2.65E-02 
Essential service water system 1.77E-02 Normal primary make-up system 1.47E-02 
Normal primary make-up system 1.17E-02 AC power supply system 1.35E-02 
3
rd
 group 
(low) 
Main feedwater system 9.09E-03 TG stop valves 6.88E-03 
Scram system 5.49E-03 Essential service water system 6.30E-03 
Steam dump to the condenser  2.95E-03 Demineralizated water system 1.48E-03 
Emergency feedwater system 1.53E-03 Main condensate system 1.33E-03 
Main condensate system 1.03E-03 Main feedwater system 9.19E-04 
4
th
 group 
(negligibl
e) 
Primary overpressure protection 
system 
7.94E-04 Scram system 4.87E-04 
Demineralizated water system 5.56E-04 MCP intermediate circuit system 3.12E-04 
MCP intermediate circuit system 2.66E-04 
Primary overpressure protection 
system 
1.07E-04 
DC power supply system 1.19E-04 DC power supply system 1.25E-05 
Boron preparation system 1.59E-05 Boron preparation system 8.13E-06 
Heat sink system 2.92E-06 Heat sink system 4.49E-06 
 
                                                 
9
 Dominant contributor information is more related to initiating events ranking. However it is necessary to highlight that 
Fussel-Vesely value contains also information on risk impact coming from particular system failure.  
10
 40 years long-term prediction results have been used for comparison purposes in order to capture ageing impact on 
systems role in plant risk profile. 
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Highlighted cells in the right column indicate systems for which risk importance group has 
been changed from lower to higher. Results presented in Table 7 have been used for integrated 
decision making.  
 
Integrated decision  
Integrated decision making was done by combining the current system categorization with the 
grouping presented in Table 7. Combination of mentioned factors has been done using risk-informed 
matrix presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 - Risk-informed systems zoning matrix 
 
 Risk importance  
Group 
System type 
1st group 
(high) 
2nd group 
(medium) 
3rd group 
(low) 
4th group 
(negligible) 
Safety systems (SFS) I II III III 
Normal operation systems 
related to safety (SRS) 
II II III IV 
Systems dedicated to 
normal operation (SNO) 
III III IV IV 
 
 
Table 9 - Zoning of plant systems for base case and aging PSA results 
 
Base case PSA Zone System Ageing PSA Zone 
II AC power supply system II 
IV Boron preparation system IV 
III DC power supply system III 
IV Demineralizated water system IV 
I Emergency core cooling system II 
III Emergency feedwater system II 
II Essential service water system III 
II Fast steam isolation valves II 
IV Heat sink system IV 
IV Main condensate system IV 
IV Main feedwater system IV 
IV MCP intermediate circuit system IV 
II Normal primary make-up system II 
III Primary overpressure protection system III 
II Residual heat removal system II 
III Scram system III 
II SG diesel make-up system II 
II SG seismic make-up system I 
I Spray system I 
II Steam dump to the atmosphere II 
III Steam dump to the condenser II 
III TG stop valves IV 
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According to the risk matrix, systems are categorized on 4 zones (I, II, III and IV) depending on 
the type of system and its quantitative risk importance. Each of presented zones implies certain test & 
maintenance strategy. Graded test & maintenance requirements should be applied for different zones 
(e.g. most strict requirements should be assigned to the systems in zone I, then zone II, etc.). 
Development of specific test & maintenance requirements should be done by taking into account the 
mentioned zoning.  
Results presented in Table 7 have been used for systems zoning according to the matrix (see 
Table 9).  
 
From the results presented in Table 9 it is clear that systems zoning is different for base case 
PSA model and ageing PSA model application. In particular, the following systems should be 
assigned to a higher zone (with high requirements), if ageing factor is taken into account: 
 Steam dump to the condenser, 
 SG seismic make-up system and 
 Emergency feedwater system. 
 
For several systems, the assigned zone was decreased due to APSA model application, 
compared with the base case PSA results (e.g. emergency core cooling system, essential service 
water system and TG stop valves). In such cases, decision making process could foresee assignment 
of a higher zone, in order to remain on conservative side. Thereby the main advantage of APSA 
model application is the possibility to adjust test & maintenance strategies in order to pay more 
attention on the systems vulnerable to the ageing.  
 
 
Application of PSA results for modernizations prioritization 
 
Modernization program of ANPP Unit 2 is developed based on complex investigation, which 
includes both probabilistic and deterministic analysis results. In order to achieve an efficient 
modernization program, the list of measures to be implemented at the plant requires prioritization. 
The decisions on the prioritization also imply consideration of deterministic and probabilistic 
outputs. In terms of safety-related measures prioritization, the main qualitative reference is the list of 
safety issues specific for VVER-440 type reactors. Categorization and thorough descriptions of 
VVER-440 safety issues are presented in IAEA TECDOC-640, [13]. Issues both related to design and 
operation are ranked, according to their safety significance, in four categories of increasing severity, 
as follows:  
 Category I: Issues in Category I reflect a deviation from the recognized international 
practices. It may be appropriate to address them as part of actions that solve higher 
priority issues. 
 Category II: Issues in Category II are of safety concern. Defence in depth is degraded, 
and actions are required to solve the issue. 
 Category III: Issues in Category III are of high safety concern. Defence in depth is 
insufficient. Immediate corrective actions are necessary, and interim measures might also 
be necessary. 
 Category IV: Issues in Category IV are of critical concern. Defence in depth is 
unacceptable. Immediate action is required to overcome the issue. Compensatory 
measures have to be established until the safety problems are solved. 
 
PSA output implies information on dominant initiating events (IE) contribution (see Figures 2 
and Figure 3) and risk importance parameters for systems (see table 5). For PSA output in terms of 
contribution from different IE categories, four contribution groups have been considered: 
 1st group (high importance): CDFIE (contribution from particular IE category) > 30% of 
overall CDF  
 2nd group (medium importance): 30% of total CDF > CDFIE > 20% of total CDF 
 3rd group (low importance): 20% of total CDF > CDFIE > 10% of total CDF 
 4th group (negligible): CDFIE < 10% of total CDF 
The combination of TECDOC-640 categorization and PSA information is presented in table 10.  
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Table 10 - Risk-informed prioritization matrix 
 
 PSA output 
 
TECDOC-640 issue 
1st group 
(high) 
2nd group 
(medium) 
3rd group 
(low) 
4th group 
(negligible) 
IV category safety issue I II (a) III (a) III (b) 
III category safety issue II (a) II (b) III (b) IV 
II and I category safety issue III (a) III (b) IV IV 
 
 
In comparison with the matrix presented in Table 8, here the intent was to assign more 
detailed priorities for safety-related measures. That is why the prioritization was done also for items 
within particular zone (e.g. II(a) is considered to have higher priority than II(b)). 
 
Table 11 presents information on outputs from TECDOC-640 and PSA, and the corresponding 
measure priority assigned, based on matrix presented in table 10. 
 
 
Table 11 - Summary information of TECDOC and PSA outputs, in terms of measures planned at ANPP 
 
   BASE CASE PSA AGEING PSA 
Measure 
Relevant 
IE 
category 
TECDOC 
– 640 
output 
PSA ranking 
P
11
 
PSA ranking 
P 
IE
12
 
RI
13
 
PSA 
output
11
 
IE RI 
PSA 
output  
Complex investigation 
of reactor pressure 
vessel capacity 
LOCA 1 
1 
(45.37%)
14
 
- 1 I 
1 
(38.33%) 
- 1 I 
Modification of the 
spray system 
LOCA 1 
1 
(45.37%) 
1 1 I 
1 
(38.33%) 
1 1 I 
Modernization against 
sump clogging effect 
LOCA 1 
1 
(45.37%) 
1 1 I 
1 
(38.33%) 
1 1 I 
Evaluation of essential 
service water system 
pipeline breaks in 
boron room 
LOCA 1 
1 
(45.37%) 
1 1 I 
1 
(38.33%) 
1 1 I 
Modernization of 
ECCS 
LOCA 1 
1 
(45.37%) 
1 1 I 
1 
(38.33%) 
2 1 I 
Confinement safety 
valves reliability 
enhancement  
LOCA 2 
1 
(45.37%) 
- 1 II(a) 
1 
(38.33%) 
- 1 II(a) 
Improvement of 
confinement leak-
tightness  
LOCA 2 
1 
(45.37%) 
- 1 II(a) 
1 
(38.33%) 
- 1 II(a) 
Installation of remote 
shutdown panel  
LOCA 2 
1 
(45.37%) 
- 1 II(a) 
1 
(38.33%) 
- 1 II(a) 
                                                 
11
 Each measure could be related both to the IE contribution and specific system. In such cases, a higher group was 
assigned as PSA output information (e.g. for Reliability enhancement of RHR system the IE=3 and RI=2, the final PSA 
output is considered 2). 
12
 IE – group assigned based on initiating event contribution 
13
 RI - group assigned based on system risk importance 
14
 Value in brackets reflects portion of particular IE contribution in overall CDF 
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   BASE CASE PSA AGEING PSA 
Measure 
Relevant 
IE 
category 
TECDOC 
– 640 
output 
PSA ranking 
P
11
 
PSA ranking 
P 
IE
12
 
RI
13
 
PSA 
output
11
 
IE RI 
PSA 
output  
Verification of the 
capability of 
ventilation system for 
cooling ECCS and 
spray system after 
reconstruction 
LOCA 2 
1 
(45.37%) 
1 1 II(a) 
1 
(38.33%) 
1 1 II(a) 
Verification of the 
capability of 
ventilation system for 
cooliing of reliable 
power supply 
switchgear  
- 2 - 2 2 II(b) - 2 2 II(b) 
Reliability 
enhancement of RHR 
system  
Transient 2 
3 
(10.78%) 
2 2 II(b) 
3 
(13.91%) 
2 2 II(b) 
Complex PTS 
evaluation  
SLB 2 
2 
(25.55%) 
2 2 II(b) 
1 
(39.75%) 
2 1 II(a) 
Modification of 
emergency 
feedwater system  
Transient 1 
3 
(10.78%) 
3 3 III(a) 
3 
(13.91%) 
2 2 II(a) 
Modification of the 
primary circuit 
overpressure 
protection system  
Transient 2 
3 
(10.78%) 
4 3 III(b) 
3 
(13.91%) 
4 3 III(b) 
Secondary side 
piping reliability 
assessment  
SLB 3 
2 
(25.55%) 
2 2 III(b) 
1 
(39.75%) 
2 1 III(a) 
Investigation of 
external grid recovery 
action in case of 
LOSP 
LOSP 3 
4 
(1.23%) 
- 4 IV 
4 
(0.28%) 
- 4 IV 
Enhancement of 
reactor protection 
system reliability 
Reactivity 
accidents 
3 
4 
(2.26%) 
3 3 IV 
4 
(2.29%) 
3 3 IV 
 
From Table11 results it could be concluded that the overall prioritization profile is quite similar 
for base case PSA and ageing PSA models. However some differences still exists, for instance the 
measure related to “Modification of emergency feedwater system” has changed it priority from III to II. 
Also sub-priorities of “PTS evaluation” and “Secondary side piping reliability assessment” have been 
changed with APSA model.  
 
It could be concluded that although APSA model could not significantly change the 
prioritization of modernizations. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Time-dependent reliability analysis has been performed for selected equipments, modelled in 
PSA of Armenian NPP Unit 2. Increasing ageing trends have been found and trend patterns were 
identified for several components, particularly for 6kV buses, switcher, 6kV/0.4kV breakers, motor 
valves and pressure sensors.  
 
Evaluated reliability parameters have been integrated in PSA model which was used for 
recalculations for different lifetime periods (25, 30, 35, 40 and 45 years of operation). The results of 
quantification show that CDF value is significantly increasing in time. In particular, a huge increase of 
CDF value (by a factor of 120) was observed in the period from 40 to 45 years of operation, but large 
uncertainties found for long-term predictions (45 years operation). It has been concluded that 
adequate predictions could be done only for relatively short time periods – comparable with already 
collected statistics. Meanwhile it is necessary to develop an approach for thorough uncertainty 
analysis, taking into account the ageing aspects.  
 
Quantifications were implemented for base case PSA and ageing PSA models. The obtained 
results have been compared in detail, on MCS level, system level and on components level.  
 
MCS investigation shows an increasing trend of general transient contribution in overall CDF 
value. LOCA type events and secondary breaks continue to remain the main contributors in ANPP 
risk profile. 
 
According to obtained results, the CDF value is highly dependent on the reliability of the 
following systems and their associated safety functions (conditioned by large contribution of primary 
and secondary leakage events): 
 ECCS to provide cooling water to primary circuit, 
 Spray system to provide cooling of boron tank and 
 Steam isolation valves to prevent PTS.  
 
Since steam isolation valves are newly installed they were not further analyzed. Detailed 
investigation was performed to monitor the reliability of ECCS and spray system. Investigation shows 
that failure probabilities of systems are increasing due to ageing. Rapid increase of failure probability 
is observed for spray system (by a factor of 35), while for emergency make-up system the increase 
factor is not more than 6. This effect is induced by a better redundancy applied in emergency make-
up system design, in comparison with spray system. Modernisation of spray system is recommended 
in order to increase its reliability. It is important to mention that the necessity of spray system 
modernization was also one of the outcomes of base case PSA model quantification. Level of 
resolution of FT analysis allowed revealing that proportions of contribution of different components 
groups are changing in time. Particularly, significant increase of I&C and electrical equipment 
contribution is observed, which is conditioned by high ageing rate observed for such components. 
 
Risk importance analysis was performed for system level and components level using Fussel-
Vesely (FV) parameter as an indicator. According to obtained results, the contribution to the overall 
risk coming from the following systems is rapidly increasing in time (more than a factor of 2).  
 Spray system, 
 SG seismic make-up system, 
 Steam dump systems,  
 Emergency feedwater system and 
 Demineralizated water system. 
 
Significance of spray system was already observed using base case PSA model. Meanwhile 
importance of the rest of listed systems was found based on Ageing PSA results, and it’s induced by 
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their vulnerability to the ageing process.  It is necessary to mention that those systems play an 
intensive role in the event trees reflecting general transient events, which were found as most 
sensitive from ageing point of view.  
 
Importance analysis performed at components level shows that importance profile of 
components is drastically changing due to ageing. In particular, the following components were not 
important based on base case PSA quantification results, but will become critical due to ageing: 
 Main gate valves of RCS, 
 Switcher of 2B-20 valve, 
 Switchers of 2B-12/1-3 valves, 
 FSIVs switchers, 
 6kV safety buses (3,4RB-2), 
 Switchers of ESP discharge valves 2AP-4/1,2, 
 Switchers of steam dump valves to condenser (BRUK), 
 Switchers of steam dump valves to atmosphere (BRUA), 
 Switchers of ESP, 
 Switcher of R-3 regulator (on the line from NMP to Prz) and  
 Switcher of EFW discharge valves (21,22VP-17). 
 
According to obtained results the data used from TIRGALEX databases did not have 
significant influence on risk profile. Final results of Ageing PSA model are mainly driven by ageing 
trend analyses performed based on VVER and plant specific data. 
 
It is necessary to highlight that obtained results are very much dependent on the assumption 
stating that no modernizations or significant replacement of equipment is considered in Ageing PSA 
model. Thus appropriate monitoring and renovation is necessary for components which are found 
being vulnerable to ageing. 
 
Principles of integrated risk-informed decision making have been discussed using framework 
presented in IAEA INSAG-25 document. The proposed decision making approach has been used for: 
 plant system classification and 
 plant safety-related modernizations prioritization. 
 
The performed exercise allowed demonstrating practical applicability of decision making 
process and advantages of Ageing PSA model application. It was concluded that Ageing PSA model 
could be an useful tool for predictive test & maintenance strategy development at system level and 
useful for improving the modernization program priorities. 
 
It is necessary to stress-out that application of Ageing PSA model allowed to have a broader 
view to the safety issues for considered NPP. Incorporation of ageing aspects in PSA models shows 
necessity of modernizations for several systems and components which were hidden in base case 
PSA model. Having both results, of current situation and prediction of risk profile, it is possible to 
develop a more precise and efficient action plan for the future. 
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APPENDIX 1. TIME-DEPENDENT RELIABILITY DATASET TO BE INCORPORATED IN 
PSA MODEL 
 
Table A1.1. Components reliability values for selected operational time-points 
 
 Component Failure mode 
Model 
(pattern) 
Base 
case 
value in 
PSA 
model 
Reliability values for selected operational 
time-points (years) 
30 35 40 45 
1.  6kV buses Fail to operate Loglinear 2.13E-07 2.71E-05 4.11E-05 6.22E-05 9.43E-05 
2.  Switcher Fail to operate Loglinear 1.03E-04 2.59E-03 1.25E-02 6.02E-02 2.90E-01 
3.  0.4kV breaker Fail to change 
position Power 2.47E-06 7.83E-05 9.56E-05 1.14E-04 1.33E-04 
Fail to remain 
in position Loglinear 5.64E-07 2.29E-06 4.28E-06 8.00E-06 1.50E-05 
4.  Motor valve 
(>100mm) 
Fail to change 
position Loglinear 7.93E-06 1.09E-05 1.58E-05 2.28E-05 3.31E-05 
5.  Pressure 
sensor Fail to operate Loglinear 1.35E-06 1.20E-05 3.91E-05 1.27E-04 4.14E-04 
6.  6kV breaker Fail to change 
position Loglinear 4.05E-06 4.21E-06 4.85E-06 5.59E-06 6.45E-06 
7.  Motor valve 
(<100mm) 
Fail to change 
position Power 3.96E-06 1.55E-05 1.64E-05 1.72E-05 1.79E-05 
8.  0.4kV bus Fail to operate Linear 4.02E-07 4.09E-07 4.14E-07 4.20E-07 4.25E-07 
9.  Manual valve Fail to change 
position Linear 8.69E-05 1.03E-04 1.17E-04 1.31E-04 1.44E-04 
Fail to remain 
open Linear 5.86E-07 5.99E-07 6.10E-07 6.21E-07 6.32E-07 
Fail to remain 
close Linear 7.01E-08 8.33E-08 9.43E-08 1.05E-07 1.16E-07 
10.  Intermediate 
circuit cooling 
pump 
Fail on demand Linear 3.12E-05 3.25E-05 3.36E-05 3.47E-05 3.58E-05 
Fail to run  Linear 1.23E-04 1.24E-04 1.25E-04 1.27E-04 1.28E-04 
11.  ESFW pump
1
 Fail on demand Linear 3.87E-06 5.19E-06 6.29E-06 7.39E-06 8.49E-06 
Fail to run  Linear 9.61E-05 9.74E-05 9.85E-05 9.96E-05 1.01E-04 
12.  EFW pump
2
 Fail on demand Linear 3.87E-06 5.19E-06 6.29E-06 7.39E-06 8.49E-06 
Fail to run  Linear 9.61E-05 9.74E-05 9.85E-05 9.96E-05 1.01E-04 
13.  Transformer ≤ 
6kV Fail to run  Linear 7.25E-07 7.35E-07 7.44E-07 7.52E-07 7.61E-07 
14.  Check valve 
(D≤100mm) 
Fail to open Linear 8.14E-08 1.04E-07 1.23E-07 1.42E-07 1.61E-07 
Fail to close Linear 7.32E-07 7.55E-07 7.74E-07 7.93E-07 8.12E-07 
15.  Check valve 
(D>100mm) 
Fail to open Linear 2.62E-07 2.85E-07 3.04E-07 3.23E-07 3.42E-07 
Fail to close Linear 9.30E-08 1.16E-07 1.35E-07 1.54E-07 1.73E-07 
Fail to remain Linear 1.88E-07 2.11E-07 2.30E-07 2.49E-07 2.68E-07 
                                                 
1
 ESFW – Emergency seismic feedwater 
2
 EFW – Emergency feedwater 
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 Component Failure mode 
Model 
(pattern) 
Base 
case 
value in 
PSA 
model 
Reliability values for selected operational 
time-points (years) 
30 35 40 45 
close 
Fail to remain 
open Linear 9.43E-08 1.17E-07 1.36E-07 1.55E-07 1.74E-07 
16.  Steam dump 
valves 
Fail to change 
position Linear 5.28E-06 6.58E-06 7.67E-06 8.76E-06 9.85E-06 
Fail to remain 
close Linear 1.70E-05 2.12E-05 2.47E-05 2.82E-05 3.17E-05 
17.  Spray pump Fail on demand Linear 5.00E-06 5.03E-06 5.06E-06 5.09E-06 5.11E-06 
Fail to run  Linear 2.07E-04 2.08E-04 2.09E-04 2.11E-04 2.12E-04 
18.  Interlock 
switcher Fail to operate 
Linear 1.08E-06 2.46E-06 3.61E-06 4.76E-06 5.91E-06 
19.  Motor driven 
duct 
Fail to change 
position 
Linear 2.64E-05 4.80E-05 6.60E-05 8.40E-05 1.02E-04 
20.  TG stop 
valves Fail to close 
Linear 8.46E-06 1.09E-05 1.29E-05 1.49E-05 1.69E-05 
21.  Emergency 
make-up 
pump  
Fail on demand Constant 7.09E-06 7.09E-06 7.09E-06 7.09E-06 7.09E-06 
Fail to run  Constant 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 
22.  Drainage 
pumps  
Fail on demand Constant 1.97E-06 1.97E-06 1.97E-06 1.97E-06 1.97E-06 
Fail to run  Constant 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 
23.  RHR pumps  Fail on demand Constant 4.17E-06 4.17E-06 4.17E-06 4.17E-06 4.17E-06 
Fail to run  Constant 5,80E-04 5,80E-04 5,80E-04 5,80E-04 5,80E-04 
24.  Main 
feedwater 
pumps  
Fail on demand Constant 2.09E-05 2.09E-05 2.09E-05 2.09E-05 2.09E-05 
Fail to run  Constant 1.75E-05 1.75E-05 1.75E-05 1.75E-05 1.75E-05 
25.  Diesel-
generator  
Fail on demand Constant 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 
Fail to run  Constant 1.82E-03 1.82E-03 1.82E-03 1.82E-03 1.82E-03 
26.  Primary 
device of 
pressure 
sensors 
Fail to operate Constant 6.49E-07 6.49E-07 6.49E-07 6.49E-07 6.49E-07 
27.  Fast changing 
filter 
Fail to operate 
Constant 8.50E-07 8.50E-07 8.50E-07 8.50E-07 8.50E-07 
28.  Normal make-
up pump  
Fail on demand Constant 5.08E-06 5.08E-06 5.08E-06 5.08E-06 5.08E-06 
Fail to run  Constant 8,70E-04 8,70E-04 8,70E-04 8,70E-04 8,70E-04 
29.  Primary 
device of 
level sensors 
Fail to operate 
Constant 5.20E-07 5.20E-07 5.20E-07 5.20E-07 5.20E-07 
30.  Secondary 
device of 
level sensors 
Fail to operate 
Constant 3.70E-06 3.70E-06 3.70E-06 3.70E-06 3.70E-06 
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Table A1.2. LOCA frequencies values for selected operational time-points 
 
Break size  
(mm) 
Years of  
operation  
13 42 77 178 356 788 
25 year 6.70E-03 4.70E-04 1.30E-05 1.20E-06 1.10E-07 1.50E-08 
30 year 6.10E-03 5.07E-04 1.80E-05 1.73E-06 1.63E-07 2.30E-08 
35 year 5.50E-03 5.43E-04 2.30E-05 2.27E-06 2.17E-07 3.10E-08 
40 year 4.90E-03 5.80E-04 2.80E-05 2.80E-06 2.70E-07 3.90E-08 
45 year 4.30E-03 6.17E-04 3.30E-05 3.33E-06 3.23E-07 4.70E-08 
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APPENDIX 2. COMPARISON OF MCS ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR BASE CASE AND 
AGEING PSA MODELS 
 
The table presents contribution from each mitigating function for a particular initiating event 
group. Values have been calculated for each operational period considered (25, 30, 35 and 40 years).  
The table presents only the initiating events which have high contribution to overall CDF (80% 
contribution) calculated for a particular period, other initiators which had less contribution are not 
included.  
 
# 
Initiating 
event 
MCS groups description 
% of CDFIE 
25 30 35 40 
1.   
        
       
  
Steam line 
break 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank during F&B process (secondary F&B function is 
failed consequentially by IE - Turbine hall effect) 
75.23 84.93 91.51 97.39 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit during F&B process (secondary F&B function is 
failed consequentially by IE - Turbine hall effect) 
16.55 10.58 5.97 2.03 
CD due to other failure (mainly COP problem due to 
FSIV failure) 
8.2 4.47 2.51 0.58 
2.   
        
RPV rupture RPV rupture directly leads to CD due to insufficient 
core cooling capabilities. 
100 100 100 100 
3.   
       
Unprotected 
LOCA 
Very large LOCAs directly lead to CD due to insufficient 
core cooling capabilities. 100 100 100 100 
4.   
        
       
  
Very small 
LOCA (NIS) 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank 
91.65 94.54 97.34 99.11 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit 
4.78 2.96 1.40 0.40 
CD due to failure of support systems (ESWS, AC 
power, etc.) 
3.57 2.50 1.25 0.50 
5.   
        
       
  
Medium 
LOCA (IS) 
CD due to other failure of ECCS to supply water to 
primary circuit 
91.18 84.09 70.38 33.67 
CD due to failure of support systems (ESWS, AC 
power, etc.) 
3.99 10.83 11.70 5.77 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank 
4.83 5.08 17.93 60.56 
6.   
        
       
  
Small LOCA 
(NIS) 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank 
75.66 82.59 89.86 96.38 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit 
21.49 13.26 7.86 2.59 
CD due to failure of support systems (ESWS, AC 
power, etc.) 
2.85 4.15 2.29 1.03 
7.   
        
       
  
MSH rupture COP problem due to FSIVs failure 41.19 30.61 16.86 5.76 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank during F&B process (secondary F&B function is 
failed consequentialy by IE - Turbine hall effect) 
57.76 68.48 82.71 94.11 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit during F&B process (secondary F&B function is 
failed consequentialy by IE - Turbine hall effect) 
1.02 0.85 0.41 0.13 
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# 
Initiating 
event 
MCS groups description 
% of CDFIE 
25 30 35 40 
8.   
        
       
  
Large SGTR CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit (including failure of ECCS support systems) 
95.18 87.58 -
17
 - 
CD due to failure of primary depressurizing function 4.82 12.42 - - 
9.   
        
       
  
General 
transient  
CD due to COP effect after failure to close TG stop 
valves or fail to close steam dump equipment with 
additional failure of FSIVs  
37.69 20.18 11.41 1.55 
CD due to consequential grid failure with failure of DGs 
and diesel-make-up system.   
26.28 20.55 15.39 2.8 
CD due to other failures (failure of secondary heat 
removal systems)  
36.03 59.27 73.2 95.65 
10.
        
       
  
Small SGTR CD due to failure of primary depressurizing function 96.57 80.75 - - 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit (including failure of ECCS support systems) 
3.43 19.24 - - 
11.
        
       
  
Large LOCA 
(IS) 
CD due to other failure of ECCS to supply water to 
primary circuit 
82.4 73.28 59.26 - 
CD due to failure of support systems (ESWS, AC 
power, etc.) 
3.49 5.35 6.17 - 
CD due to failure of spray system 14.11 21.37 34.58 - 
12.
        
       
  
Small LOCA 
(IS) 
CD due to failure of spray system to cool down boron 
tank 
- - 80.25 95.7 
CD due to failure of ECCS to supply water to primary 
circuit 
- - 15.06 3.33 
CD due to failure of support systems (ESWS, AC 
power, etc.) 
- - 4.69 0.97 
 
 
                                                 
17
 “-” mark means that the considered initiating event group is not included in the list of initiating events that contributes with  
80% to CDF, for a particular period  
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